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Policy design as an irreversible investment under uncertainty:  
Norwegian agriculture and the WTO  
1. Introduction 
Applied agricultural policy analyses are often concerned about the effects of the type and the 
size of policy instruments on (parts of) the economy.  They usually neglect that timing of a 
policy reform can be a third choice variable for policy makers.  Since many policy reforms imply 
irreversible costs due to aspects of commitment, the central question raised in this article is 
therefore: ‘At what point in time should a policy reform be implemented when the reform 
involves irreversible costs and the future is uncertain?‘  The problem is approached by welfare 
theory and modern investment theory, and applied to Norwegian agriculture in the context of a 
prospective agreement on agriculture in the World Trade Organisation (WTO).   
A new WTO agreement on agriculture affects domestic policy making in Norway in two 
ways.  It reduces the freedom of policy choice, and it promotes the transparency of the size and 
means of the policies.  The outcome of the 1995 Uruguay-round restricted the use of various 
policy instruments to support agriculture.  It caused a major shift in Norwegian agricultural 
policy as quantitative import restrictions had to be replaced by tariffs.  The second effect is less 
visible, and more difficult to assess quantitatively.  The current WTO agreement caused 
agricultural support to be in the focus of public discussion.  This has been accomplished by the 
use of transparent measurements of agricultural support that simplify the impenetrable jungle of 
policy instruments.  Interest groups that are likely to have opposite interests in relation to 
farmers on various policy aspects (consumers want lower food prices, taxpayers desire reduced 
transfers to the farm sector, etc.) might have improved their relative political power.   
Policy makers are supposed to have the opportunity to implement a long-term policy 
reform that compensates farmers for closing down the farm, or equivalently, for not start 
farming.  Such policies are not so unusual as it might seem.  In the EU and Norway, early 
retirement schemes and programs to buy out milk producers are put in place.  The main dif-
ference is that those programs do not require farmers to close down the farm.  In order to make 
the policy reform credible the compensation payments are considered to be irreversible once the 
program is in place.  In addition, the total costs of the policy reform may exceed the pure 
compensation payments due to social costs or multiplier effects elsewhere in the economy.  All 
this takes place in an environment of uncertainty about future conditions.  Given these 
conditions, there exists an option to wait to implement the policy reform now that creates an 
opportunity cost that needs to be taken into account in the calculation of the expected net present 
value of the policy reform.  
The theory used in this article combines traditional welfare analysis with modern in-
vestment theory under uncertainty.  Dixit and Pindyck [DP] (1994) have treated the latter in 
detail in the case of investment decisions for firms.  Recent empirical applications can be found 
in natural resource economics and agricultural economics.
1   
                                                 
1  See Pindyck (1999) for an application and overview in the field of environmental policies.  Tegene, Wiebe, and 
Kuhn (1999) study farmland conversion.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994) analyze price stabilization policies, while 
Fisher and Hanemann (1990) discuss the concept of the option value with regard to the contingent valuation 
method.     2
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 gives an introduction into the dynamics of 
investment under uncertainty and presents the theoretical model based on DP (1994).   
Comparative static results complete this section.  One important result is that the option value 
provides an economic argument that supports ‘opportunistic behavior’ of policy makers.  That is, 
a policy reform will be delayed if policy makers expect a future situation in which the relative 
political power of those who benefit from the reform increases.  A description of the 
parameterization of the numerical model together with the results is given in section 3.  Section 4 
suggests possible improvements of the model, and concludes with a short discussion on the rele-
vance of the concept of the option value for applied policy analysis.   
2. Framework 
A standard approach to deal with the kind of dynamic welfare analysis outlined above would be 
to calculate the net present value (NPV) of the policy reform proposal, with the decision criteria 
to implement the policy reform whenever NPV > 0.  DP (1994) state three conditions under 
which the standard approach may lead to an incorrect result: (1) policy makers stand free in the 
timing of the policy reform, (2) the policy reform incurs irreversible (sunk) costs, and (3) the 
value of some variables is uncertain (stochastic).   
Policy makers are legally given the right to decide the timing of a new policy.  Sometimes 
they are restricted in the timing decision by laws or other (international) agreements.  The degree 
of freedom to act, however, depends partly on the policy makers themselves as they may choose 
to act in advance of the adoption of new law.  The policy reform discussed here is assumed not 
to be in conflict with either the current or a new WTO agreement, because the payments are 
made contingent on the farmer’s decision to close down the farm (decoupled income support).  
Therefore, policy makers have the opportunity to postpone the policy reform.   
Policy reforms in agriculture are often perpetual for reasons of predictability and 
credibility.  In the US and the EU, for example, policy reforms have a perspective of 4-5 years.  
The compensation payments for closing down the farms (or not start farming) are considered to 
be irreversible once the policy is set into law.  In addition, agricultural investments are often 
enduring and involve irreversible costs, too.  Moreover, spillover effects may contribute to addi-
tional costs elsewhere in the economy, because agriculture is still important in remote areas in 
Norway.  A decrease in agricultural activity may require adjustment costs to promote alternative 
industries, or to stabilize the population density in these areas if this is an overall policy 
objective.  Hence, the total costs of the reform may exceed the pure compensation payments to 
farmers.  
The prospective costs and benefits of any policy reform project are uncertain since they 
involve future payment streams.  As will be shown below, the opportunity costs of the policy 
reform depend to a large extent on this kind of uncertainty.   
2.1 Model  formulation 
Let A be a stock variable associated with agricultural activity.  In general, A could represent 
capital, land, the number of holdings, or labor force.  For the purpose of illustration, A is 
assumed to measure labor force.  The evolution of A over time is given by:    3
() () t A t N
dt
dA
δ − =  (1) 
where δ is the exogenously given yearly rate at which (old) farmers leave the agricultural sector 
(i.e., t is measured in years).  N(t) approximates the number of actual successors (young farmers) 
per year.  Empirical evidence shows that labor force in agriculture is decreasing over time.  
Therefore, there must always be some potential successors who do not start farming.
2  N(t) is 
assumed to be the control variable that can be governed by policy makers through the policy 
reform.   
Consider an ever-lasting policy that grants potential entrants into agriculture a fixed 
payment provided that they (a) do not take over the farm and (b) no longer use the resources on 
the farm for farming activities.  Implemented at t = s the policy reduces the number of actual 
entrants prior to the reform, N0(s), once and for all to some value N1(s).  The impact of the policy 
reform at any r ≥ s is given by [N0(r) – N1(r)].   
The flow of benefits and costs associated with A is defined by:  
() t t t t t cA bA A H θ θ − = ,  (2) 
Parameter b is the per unit benefit of A, while c measures the per unit cost associated with 
A.  θ is a stochastic variable representing the preference for costs relative to benefits.  The 
formulation of H(•) opens for two interpretations.  First, H(•) could be viewed as a kind of 
conventional social welfare function (SWF) with two interest groups; those who benefit from A, 
and those who loose from A.  The economy could be described as if a central planner would 
maximize (2) for a given θt.  Second, H(•) could be interpreted as a policy preference function 
(PPF) where θt denotes the relative political power of ‘the losers’ relative to ‘the favored’.  The 
existence of a central planner is denied, and the value of θt measures the outcome of the political 
process.  For the purpose of the model, both interpretations are possible.  Henceforth, I call θt the 
‘relative political weight’ parameter for clarity.   
The stochastic variable θ introduces uncertainty in the model.  Its stochastic process is of 
particular importance.  I assume that θ follows a geometric Brownian motion defined by:  
dθ = αθdt + σθdz (3) 
where α is a growth variable, σ is a variance parameter, and dz is the increment of a Wie-
ner process.  The expectation and the variance of dθ are given by: E[dθ] = αθdt, and Var[dθ] = σ
 
2θ
 2dt (DP, 1994: 71).  θ takes only non-negative values which makes it suitable to interpret θ as 
relative weights.   
The objective of the policy makers is to choose the optimal size of the policy reform, (N0 – 
N1)  that maximizes expected net present social welfare W conditioned on the stochastic 
development of θ:   
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2   The formulation implies that the stock variable eventually reaches zero.  Implications of this issue are discussed 
in section 4.    4
subject to the evolution of A given by (1).  E0[•] denotes the expectation based on the 
information at time t = 0.  The first term represents the expected value of the flow of A at time t 
= 0 discounted at discount rate r, and the second term denotes the expected discounted value of 
the costs of implementing the policy reform at the (uncertain) time of implementation T
~
.   
The policy problem compares to an optimal stopping problem with a binary choice for the 
policy makers (Pindyck, 1999; DP, 1994): Continue the current policy with N = N0, or adopt a 
policy reform that leads to N1 ≤ N0.  Since θ is the only stochastic variable, the choice depends 
eventually on the evolution of θ.  Intuitively, there will be some point of indifference between 
continuing the current policy and adopting the new policy.  Let θ* denote this critical value of θ.  
Continuation will be optimal for all for θ ≤ θ*, and adoption of the policy reform will be optimal 
for all θ ≥ θ*.  This decision criteria follows from the fact that the net benefit of implementing 
the reform is convex in θ which in turn follows from (7), (8), and (10) below.   
The formulation of the decision problem exhibits close similarities to actual policy 
decision-making processes.  Politicians are influenced in their policy choices by polls and other 
methods revealing public opinion.  In this model, politicians are implicitly supposed to 
continuously reveal the public opinion (i.e., the actual value of θ) and to implement the policy 
reform once the public opinion has shifted in favor for policy reform (i.e., θ ≥ θ*).   
Let W
C(θ,A) and W
R(θ,A) denote the present value functions for the continuation of the 
current policy and the adoption of the policy reform (excluding the costs of policy reform), 
respectively.  The optimal stopping problem can be defined as follows:   
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where H
C(θ,t) represents the payoff function at N0, and H
R(θ,t) denotes the payoff function at N1.  
Note that W(θ,t) is a Bellman equation based on the principle of splitting up the profit in the 
immediate period and in the continuation value.  Given the first period decision, the remaining 
choices are assumed to be chosen optimally (DP, 1994: 100).   
In the continuation region, the first term will be greater than the second term, while the 
opposite holds in the adoption region.  Using Ito’s Lemma to get rid of the expectations and 
disregarding the cost term K(N1)) for a moment, (6) is valid in the continuation region, while (7) 
is valid in the adoption region (DP 1994:109):   
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The only difference between the two functions is the level of N, i.e., the number of entrants 
into agriculture in each period.  The solution of the differential equations (6) and (7) is given by:  
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Parameter β is crucial for the concept of the option value.  As equations (20) and (21) 
below show β drives a wedge between θ* of a project calculated with the option value and θ* of 
a project calculated without the option value.  Therefore, β will be called the ‘wedge’ parameter.  
An increase in uncertainty by raising α and/or σ
 2, reduces the value of β, but (according to (20) 
and (21) below) increases the wedge.  In other words, the greater uncertainty the greater the 
error, which is made in the calculation of an NPV disregarding the option value.   
The term Dθ
β represents the value of the option to adopt the policy reform in the future, or 
equivalently, the cost of giving up the opportunity to wait.  
The costs of adopting the policy reform, K(N1), are assumed to be quadratic in (N0-N1):   
K(N1) = k0 + k1(N0 – N1) + k2(N0 – N1)
2 (11) 
This is a clear simplification, even if the costs can be expected to be convex in (N0-N1) be-
cause costs may increase non-linear as one departs from the current policy.  The particular 
choice of the quadratic functional form is merely an approximation of a more general convex 
function.   
There are four variables to be determined: N*, β, D and θ*.  N* will be a function of θ: N* 
= N1(θ*).  Hence, we need three independent equations:   
() 0 , 0 = A W
C  (12) 
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(12) has already been used in the calculation of β in (10).  It reflects the fact that θ remains 
at zero forever, once it has reached zero.  This follows directly from the definition of the 
geometric Brownian motion in (3) since dθ = 0 for θ = 0.  (13) is the ‘value-matching’ condition.  
The critical value of θ, θ*, is given at the point where the net present value of continuing the 
current policy equals the net present value of adopting the policy reform.  (14) is the ‘smooth-
pasting’ condition and requires the slopes of the two net present value functions to be equal at 
θ*.  Therefore, the value functions must be continuous in θ* (Pindyck, 1999: 8).   
Before determining D and θ*, I consider N*.  N* is chosen so as to maximize the net 
present value of the policy reform at the time of adoption:   6
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The first order condition becomes:  
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Substituting (16) back into (13) and (14), we get the following solution for θ* and D: 
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D  (18) 
where p = (r-α)(r+δ-α).   
Note that the solution is given by the largest root of the quadratic equation behind (17), 
since (W
R – W
C – K) is convex in θ*.  Considering (17), β > 2 (where β is the ‘wedge parame-
ter’) is required in order to get a valid solution.  If β < 2, (17) and (18) are no longer valid.  
Instead, N* = 0, and the new critical value θ* can be calculated using (12) – (14) as before.  
Also, by definition, (17) is only true in the range 0 ≤ N* ≤ N0.  For other values of N*, (17) and 
(18) do no longer apply.  In these cases we get corner solutions with either N* = 0 (if N* from 
(16) < 0) or N* = N0 (if N* from (16) > N0).  The corresponding critical value θ* can be 
calculated as before.   
To conclude this section θ* in (17) is compared with the critical value of θ if the 
conventional concept of the NPV had been used.  In the latter case, Dθ
β = 0, and the critical 
value of θ, θ*conv, is defined by (from (13)): 
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Let θ*adj denote θ* from (17), one gets:  



























































=  (20)   7
The opportunity to delay the policy reform drives a wedge between the critical values.  The 
wedge is positive as long as β > 2.  In the special case when fixed costs are zero, the wedge 








=  (21) 
An increase in the variance rate σ, the growth rate α, and in the discount rate r all increase 
the wedge in (21).  The greater uncertainty, the greater the error that is made if the NPV is not 
adjusted for the opportunity costs of giving up the option to wait.  The cost parameters increase 
the wedge between θ*adj and θ*conv only if fixed costs are positive.   
3.  Numerical application  
The analytical results in the previous section indicate only the direction of changes in parameters 
on the design of policy reform, but not their strength.  Some analytical results are ambiguous or 
difficult to obtain.  In this respect, the presentation of a numerical application serves two 
different objectives.  First, it indicates the strength of parameters on the design of the policy 
reform, and second, it provides an example of how the theory can be applied to real world policy 
analysis.  
3.1  Assumptions and choice of parameters 
The availability of appropriate data for that kind of policy analysis for Norwegian agriculture is 
very limited.  Due to a lack of econometric estimates, it has been necessary to construct some 
parameter values rather intuitively.  Most of the data are taken from the National Account of 
Agriculture provided by the NILF (Budsjettnemnda for jordbruket [BFJ] var. iss.), and the PSE 
database of the OECD (OECD 1999).  The data to calibrate the supply function and the demand 
function are taken from the PSE-database for the year 1997 
Let a single composite agricultural product represent Norwegian agriculture.  Furthermore, 
assume linear functional forms.  Although a simplification, it is rather the rule than the exception 
in applied welfare analysis in agricultural economics (e.g., Bullock, 1996; Garcia and Lothe, 
1996; Kola, 1993; and Salhofer, 1996).  The supply function and the demand function take the 
following form, respectively: 
Q
s = s0 + s1 P
s   (22) 
Q
d = d0 + d1 P
d   (23) 
where Q
s(Q
d) is the quantity supplied (demanded), and P
s(P
d) is the prevailing market price.  I 
require s1 > 0, and d1 < 0 so as to guarantee the usual upward (downward) sloping supply 
(demand) curve.   
I further assume that current Norwegian agricultural policy can be described by two policy 
instruments: a per unit tariff (T) and a per unit price support (X).  This classification facilitates 
the use of the PSE-database, and follows a common methodology to categorize agricultural 
support into a domestic support component financed by taxpayers and a market price support   8
component financed by consumers.  Although Norwegian agricultural policy reform has turned 
direct price subsidies into direct payments based on input use in recent years, direct payments 
are still tied to actual input use and hence strong related to actual production.   
The demand elasticity, η = -.35, is taken from Rickertsen (1994: 52).  The construction of 
the supply elasticity is based on two intuitive assumptions.  First, I require s0 ≤  0 so as to 
indicate that there will be no production if the product price falls below zero.  This assumption 
can be justified under the long-term perspective taken in the model.  Second, I require the world 
market price to be PWM ≥ -s0/s1.  This assumption implies that the quantity supplied will be 
positive even in the case of non-intervention.  Even if this assumption may not hold for single 
products, it can be assumed to hold for the composite agricultural product.  Clearly, the 
composition of the agricultural product may change considerably between the base year and a 
non-intervention scenario.  This is a serious objection against the chosen method.  Joint 
production which is typical for Norwegian agriculture (e.g., milk and beef, grains and pork), 
however will tend to stabilize the composition.   
Both assumptions together with the specific functional forms of the supply curve constrain 
the range of the elasticity of supply, ε: 1 ≤ ε ≤ P
s/(P
s-PWM).  I choose the average of the two 
limits which gives ε = 1.257.  Garcia and Lothe (1996) find a long run elasticity of supply of .34 
for the Norwegian milk sector in the period 1959-1982.  Kola (1993) estimates a long run 
elasticity of supply of .79 for the Finnish milk sector.  Henrichsmeyer and Witzke (1991: 291) 
report a range of the elasticity of supply for the German milk sector between .5 and 2.0.   
The benefits b of the stock variable A given some policy Y are measured as the per unit (of 







=  (24) 
Similarly, the costs of the current policy c are measured as the difference in 
consumer/taxpayer surplus under policy Y and consumer/taxpayer surplus under non-
intervention:  









=  (25) 
The non-intervention outcome is merely taken as a reference point, and not as a target of 
policy reform.  As usual, producer (consumer) surplus is measured as the geometric area above 
(below) the supply (demand) curve and below (above) the respective price line.  The taxpayer 
costs consists of two terms: Direct price support, which applies to all domestic supply, and 
export subsidies required to dispose (possible) domestic excess supply.  The assumption of linear 
functional forms simplifies the surplus calculations considerably: 
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η  (27)   9
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The direct effects of the results of a new WTO agreement are stipulated by reducing the 
tariff and the price support with 25% each, while PWM remains unchanged.  The 1995 Uruguay-
round agreement required inter alia a reduction of tariff equivalents by 36% on average (at least 
15% for each tariff item), and a reduction of domestic support by 20%.  The prospective WTO 
agreement assumed here can be seen as a moderate continuation of that agreement.  Other 
outcomes are, of course, also possible.  The per unit benefits (b) and per unit costs (c) of the 
current policy and under the WTO scenario are presented in table 1.  The amount of labor force 
in the Norwegian agricultural sector was (A1997=) 85,800 man-years in 1997 (BFJ, 1998: 23).   
Table 1. Annual benefits and costs per 
man-year in agriculture (NOK pr man-year) 
 Current  policy  WTO 
Benefits (b) 127,208  78,477 
Costs (c) 223,582  147,463 
Net benefits  -96,374  -68,986 
 
The net benefits of agricultural activity are on average estimated to be –96,374 NOK per 
man-year.  This result suggests that abolishing agricultural activity in Noway would be welfare 
improving.  The result is not surprising given the perspective of the model, which assumes 
government intervention to create deadweight losses.  
The rate of exogenous exit from agriculture δ is calculated from (1) under the assumption 
of 30 years between intergenerational transfer.  The costs of the policy reform are a main 
variable of the model, but difficult to estimate considering the lack of data on similar reforms in 
Norwegian agricultural policy.  I specify two different cost functions, K
H and K
L, to span out a 
kind of opportunity set.  Farmers are compensated for their loss in producer surplus when 
closing down the farm under the current policy.  The compensation is thus assumed to be in-
dependent from policy changes.  In particular, a farmer who shuts down after the (possible) 
implementation of a new WTO agreement is ‘overcompensated’ because producer surplus under 
WTO conditions is lower than under the current policy.   
The difference of the two cost functions lies in the size of the additional costs that could be 
generated by sunk investments in the farm sector or multiplier effects elsewhere in the economy.  
In cost function K
H the total costs exceed the pure compensation payments considerably.  The 
parameters are chosen such that the share of the linear costs is lower than 10% for 85% of the 
range of (N0 – N1).  Cost function K
L aims at representing a situation in which the reform can be 
achieved with lower additional costs.  For this cost function, the share of the compensation 
payments is greater than 50% within the entire range of (N0 – N1).  The cost functions are 
defined as follows (mill. NOK):   
K
H = 5 + 3.873 (N0 – N1) + .01 (N0 – N1)
2 (29) 
K
L = .5 + 3.873 (N0 – N1) + .001 (N0 – N1)
2 (30) 
The net present value of a removal of all entrants (i.e., N1 = 0) becomes 1,926 mill. NOK 
under the low cost alternative, and 92,879 mill. NOK under the high cost alternative.     10
No empirical estimates are available for the evolution of θ over time.  I assume two 
stochastic evolutions of θ.  The first alternative (‘Non-WTO’) aims at describing a situation in 
which the relative weights of the interest groups are more or less constant.  In this alternative, 
the parameter values are set at α = 0, and σ = .01.  The second alternative (‘WTO’) captures the 
effect of a new WTO agreement on the development of θ.  Increased domestic focus on agri-
cultural policy issues is considered to result in a positive drift rate (α = .0001)  and  higher 
uncertainty (σ = .05) compared to the ‘Non-WTO’ alternative.  The ‘WTO’ alternative is based 
on the assumption that the new WTO agreement reinforces transparency and public focus on 
Norwegian agricultural policy, which in turn leads to a shift in the relative weights in the favor 
of consumers and taxpayers.   
One way to obtain empirical estimates for the evolution of θ could be to run a series of 
PPF-studies for consecutive time periods.  Oehmke and Yao (1994) provide a model in which 
they get PPF weights for two different years.  Such an analysis would, however, constitute a 
research project on its own.   
3.2 Results 
The main results of the numerical calculations are summarized in table 2.  The scenarios differ in 
their assumptions on the policy regime, the stochastic evolution of θ, and the cost function.  The 
scenarios are constructed so as to single out the pure effect of the three components on the 
critical value θ* and the level of reduction (N0 – N1).   
Table 2. Critical value θ* and size of policy reform (N0 – N1) for different scenarios   
Scenario    
Policy regime  Evolution of θ  Cost function θ*  N0 – N1 
Current policy  Non-WTO  High  .676  175 
Current policy  Non-WTO  Low  .675  1,722 
Current policy  WTO  High  .933  1,140 
Current policy  WTO  Low  .706  2,860 
WTO Non-WTO  High  .669  117 
WTO Non-WTO  Low  .667  1,122 
WTO WTO  High  .942  743 
WTO WTO  Low  .741  2,860 
 
The two first scenarios reported in table 2 (‘Current policy, Non-WTO, •’) represent a 
situation in which there is little uncertainty about the evolution of θ.  Depending on the cost 
alternative, the policy reform should be adopted when θ reaches a critical value of .676 (high 
cost alternative), and .675 (low cost alternative).  Entry into agriculture should be permanently 
reduced by 175 and 1,722 man-years per year, respectively.   
The following two scenarios (‘Current policy, WTO, •’) capture very much of today’s 
situation in which the current policy still prevails, but the new WTO negotiations increase the 
uncertainty about the evolution of the relative political weights.  θ* increases and – depending 
on the cost alternative – the reduction of the entries into agriculture becomes considerably larger.  
In the second of these scenarios (‘Current policy, WTO, Low’), the critical value θ* is in fact a   11
corner solution with N1 = 0.  Accordingly, the policy reform should induce all potential entrants 
into agriculture to close down their farms.   
The last four scenarios illustrate the effects of a new WTO agreement on the optimal 
timing and design of the policy reform.  The pure effect of a change in the expected evolution of 
θ is unambiguous with respect to the optimal timing and size of the policy reform.  Increased 
uncertainty about the relative weight (i.e., switching from ‘Non-WTO’ to ‘WTO’) delays the 
reform and boosts its size.  The pure effect of a change in the policy regime (i.e., switching from 
‘Current policy’ to ‘WTO’) is ambiguous with respect to the optimal timing of the policy reform, 
but reduces the size unambiguously.  The reason for the ambiguity with respect to the timing 
decision is that a switch from the current policy to a WTO scenario reduces both benefits and 
costs.  A reduction in benefits reduces θ*, but a reduction in costs increases θ*.   
Although the results reported in table 2 are based on a numerical application and not on 
empirical estimates, it might be of interest to compare them with empirical studies.  According to 
van der Zee (1997), PPF studies often reveal that the relative weights of agricultural producers 
are ‘considerably higher’ (p. 106) than the weights of taxpayers and consumers.  Given the high 
levels of support to Norwegian agriculture, one should expect a similar result for Norway.  In 
Oehmke and Yao (1994: 637), the political weight of producers relative to consumers is 3.11 in 
1977 and 1.55 in 1984.  Even the lowest of these two values compares roughly to a value of θ of 
(1/1.55 =) 0.645.  They are still lower than all the critical values of θ* shown in table 2.  In other 
words and according to the numerical application, if the actual value of 1/θ were around 1.5 in 
Norway, there would be no reason to implement the policy reform under whatsoever scenario 
today. 
A closer look reveals the importance of the option value to wait for the calculation of the 
net present value of the policy reform.  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the adjusted 
NPV and the conventional NPV together with the option value of the policy reform for the 
scenario (‘WTO, WTO, High’).  The critical value of θ* for the adjusted NPV is .942, while the 
critical value for the conventional NPV is .625.  The wedge for the two critical values of θ* is 























Figure 1.  NPV and option value of policy reform for scenario (‘WTO, WTO, High’) 
(read ‘,’ as ‘.’)  
 
Welfare analysis that uses the conventional NPV would find it Pareto-improving to adopt 
of the policy reform for all θ > .625.  Suppose the actual θ to be in the range θact ∈ (.625, .942).  
The suggestion to adopt the policy reform based on this welfare analysis would be wrong since it 
does not account for the costs of giving up the opportunity to wait.  It can be concluded that the 
growing internationalization of Norwegian agriculture, here represented by a prospective WTO-
agreement, makes it necessary to be more careful when assessing the net present value of a 
policy reform.   
4.  Conclusions and possible extensions 
This article presents a unified treatment of how to integrate the opportunity costs of imple-
menting a policy reform (i.e., its option value) in a traditional welfare analysis.  The timing and 
size of a policy reform for Norwegian agriculture in advance of a prospective WTO agreement is 
chosen as a case study to illustrate the theory.  The theoretical results show that the existence of 
the option value can explain why conventional welfare analyses that do not account for these 
additional opportunity costs may find current policies to be Pareto-inferior.   
Several extensions of the model are expected to improve upon the results.  First, the 
formulation of the model presupposes that the stock variable eventually reaches zero.   
Independent from any policy choice, at some point in time, there will be no farmers left.  This is 
a very strong assumption.  One might argue that there exists a socially desirable level of 
agricultural activity.  This possibility could be captured in the model by relating costs and 
benefits to the stock variable.  Benefits (costs) could become an increasing (decreasing) function 
of the stock variable.     13
Furthermore, policy reforms are seldom once and for all decisions as assumed in the 
model.  Rather, policy makers stand usually as free to determine policies, as they stand free to 
implement policies.  Apart from the timing and size problems, the model would have to be 
extended with a ‘length of the reform’ variable.  The problem for the policy makers then 
becomes one of balancing flexibility concerns versus credibility (commitment) concerns.   
Examples from agricultural policy include the reform steps that the European Union has taken 
since 1992.  Here, crucial questions have been, and still are, the size and the committed duration 
of the policy instruments.   
Finally, many agricultural policies are often targeted towards the flows of agricultural 
products (like price subsidies or tariffs) rather than stock variables like land, labor or capital.  
Such an extension would require considerable changes in the structure of the model, but would 
probably increase its value as a tool for applied policy analysis.  
It remains to discuss the relevance of the concept of the option value for applied policy 
analysis.  The theoretical analysis and the numerical example have shown that the error made by 
ignoring the option value in the calculation of the NPV of a project (i.e., a policy reform) is 
closely related to the uncertainty about the development of the stochastic variable.  The 
incorporation of the option value has therefore to be recommended for situations in which high 
uncertainty prevails.  For Norwegian agriculture, this is in particular relevant for studies that 
analyze the impacts of a WTO agreement or EU membership.  The analysis has also revealed a 
considerable challenge on the data side in order to conduct sound empirical studies.  The lack of 
appropriate data remains probably the most important obstacle for a wider use of these kinds of 
studies, and constitutes at the same time an important challenge for future research.   
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